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Introduction 
 
“Von vornherein lebt der Phänomenologe in der Paradoxie, das Selbstverständliche als fraglich, 
als rätselhaft ansehen zu müssen und hinfort kein anderes wissenschaftliches Thema haben zu 
können als dieses: die universale Selbstverständlichkeit des Seins der Welt – für ihn das gröβte 
aller Rätsel- in eine Verständlichkeit zu verwandeln.“1 (Edmund Husserl, 1936) 
 
Starting with the publication of the first volume of the Logische Untersuchungen in 1900, Edmund 
Husserl (1859-1938) set off on a course that would radically alter European philosophy. Over the 
course of the following decades, Husserl further developed his phenomenological method as the study 
of the structures of consciousness, which he intended not just to serve as the metaphysical foundation 
of philosophy, but of all the sciences. Central to Husserl’s method is the phenomenological reduction 
or épochè, through which the phenomenologist shakes off the uncritical modes in which we normally 
view and describe the world in the natürliche Einstellung. After turning off the traditional modes of 
viewing things, the phenomenologist is able to adopt the phänomenologische Einstellung, allowing him 
or her to study things as they present themselves in consciousness, without preconceptions and 
presuppositions.2 For Husserl, the execution of the épochè problematizes the way in which we think of 
and relate to the world in the natural attitude, which he calls “das natürliche Weltbegriff.”3 The search 
for a more authentic concept of world would remain a central theme for Husserl and many of the 
phenomenologists following in his footsteps.   
  One of these phenomenologists was Husserl’s assistant Martin Heidegger (1889-1976). 
Although Heidegger worked with Husserl as his assistant, he soon started to develop phenomenology 
in very novel directions. In his first major work Sein und Zeit (henceforth; SuZ), published in 1927, 
Heidegger accuses the tradition of Western philosophy of having lost touch with the question of Being, 
an accusation which also applies to the phenomenology of Husserl. Instead of studying consciousness 
in Husserlian terms, Heidegger analyzes human existence or Dasein as being within an always and 
already pre-given world; a phenomenon he calls In-der-Welt-Sein.4 Husserl was critical of Heidegger’s 
                                                          
1 Husserl, Edmund. Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie: Eine 
Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie, (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 2012), 183-184. 
2 Husserl, Edmund. Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologische Philosophie. (Tübingen: Max 
Niemeyer Verlag, 2002), 59-60. 
3 Husserl, Edmund. Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie 1910/11. (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhof, 1977), 35. 
4 Heidegger, Martin. Sein und Zeit. (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 2006), 52-54. 
 
Introduction 
4 
 
work, claiming that it was philosophical anthropology, not phenomenology.5 He even went as far as to 
refer to his former assistant as his philosophical antipode.6  
  Despite the fact that Heidegger studied phenomenology under Husserl, very few studies have 
compared the work of both thinkers. This situation has only recently started to change. In 2012 the 
Heidegger Jahrbuch dedicated an issue on the relationship between Husserl and Heidegger,7 and the 
Heidegger Forum published a volume of comparative studies in 2010.8 Even so, in these publications 
the concept of world has all but been ignored. That such a comparative study on the concept of world 
has not been written yet is especially surprising, considering that Husserl’s concept of world has 
exerted tremendous influence on many of the twentieth century’s most influential philosophers, 
including Jean Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jacques Derrida, Hannah Arendt, and Hans-Georg 
Gadamer. The fact that this influence is often mediated through the work of Heidegger makes the need 
for a comparative study of the concept of world in Husserl and Heidegger all the more pressing. 
 Husserl reworked his concept of world in his last major work, Die Krisis der europäischen 
Wissenschaften (henceforth; Krisis). It is in Krisis that he introduces his concept of the Lebenswelt as 
the ontological horizon within which human life takes place, and which is shaped through human 
activity. Husserl claims that the worldview of the natural sciences and their tendency to objectify all 
the constituent parts of the Lebenswelt into a coherent system have become the almost exclusive 
mode of relating to the Lebenswelt. As a result, Western society threatens to lose touch with life’s 
most pressing questions; those pertaining to the meaning or meaninglessness of human existence.9 
Husserl believes his phenomenology can provide the method for reflecting on the Lebenswelt, helping 
to gain a more authentic understanding of human existence, and in this way to alleviate the crisis 
caused by the worldview of the modern sciences. Ironically, although the third part of Krisis containing 
Husserl’s treatment of the Lebenswelt was not published during Husserl’s lifetime, it is widely 
considered to be Husserl’s most influential concept.10  
  There is contention among Husserl scholars whether or not Krisis and the Lebenswelt 
constitute a shift in Husserl’s philosophy. David Carr claims that the Krisis must indeed be seen as a 
                                                          
5 Crowell, Steven Galt. Does the Husserl/Heidegger Feud Rest on a Mistake? An Essay on Psychological and 
Transcendental Phenomenology. Husserl Studies, Vol. 18, No. 2 (2002), 125. 
6 Spiegelberg, Herbert. The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction (Vol. I). (New York: Springer, 
1960), 228-230. 
7 Bernet, Rudolf, Denker, Alfred, and Zaborowski, Holger (eds.). Heidegger Jahrbuch 6. Heidegger und Husserl 
(Freiburg and München: Verlag Karl Alber, 2012).  
8 Rese, Frederik (ed.). Heidegger und Husserl im Vergleich. (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2010). 
9 Husserl, Krisis, 6. 
10 Janssen, Paul. Geschichte und Lebenswelt. Ein Beitrag zur Diskussion von Husserls Spätwerk. (Den Haag: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1970). 
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new turn in Husserl’s thought, as it introduces some novel concepts to his phenomenology.11 More 
recent scholarship has tried to downplay this novelty. Dagfinn Føllesdal for example has gone to great 
lengths to show how the Lebenswelt ties in with philosophical questions with which Husserl had 
concerned himself for over thirty years.12 David Woodruff Smith likewise stresses the continuity in 
Husserl’s thought, and the intricate way in which various aspects of it link together.13 What most of 
these studies have in common is that they take Husserl’s philosophy as a complete system, within 
which they then situate the Lebenswelt. Although such approaches are legitimate and can be insightful, 
they tend to downplay the constant developments in Husserl’s philosophy. Husserl always considered 
himself as an eternal beginner (ewige Anfänger), constantly reworking his positions while at the same 
time looking for ways to expand his phenomenology.14 Nowhere is Husserl’s constant commitment to 
rethink his philosophy more apparent than in his concept of world. It is the development of the concept 
of world that I will trace in this paper. As this investigation will show, Husserl’s concept of world 
changed considerably, from being a relatively unimportant and seemingly self-evident concept, to 
becoming the central concern of his later phenomenology, culminating with the introduction of the 
Lebenswelt.   
  The concept of world has been largely ignored in the study of the history of phenomenology 
in general. Sean Gaston’s book The Concept of World from Kant to Derrida is one of the few interpretive 
studies to have come out on this topic in recent years. Although it includes chapters on Husserl and 
Heidegger, Gaston’s work does not analyze the mutual influences between Husserl and Heidegger in 
great detail.15 Nonetheless, Gaston’s work may contribute to a resurgence of interest in the concept 
of world in the study of phenomenology. Such an increased discussion of the concept of world in 
phenomenology is much warranted, since it is perhaps the single most influential concept of 
phenomenology. Ever since the pioneering work of Husserl, phenomenological approaches to the 
concept of world have inspired research in such diverse field as sociology, architecture, history, and 
psychology.16  
  Needless to say, the concept of world is highly complicated and multi-layered, and untangling 
and unraveling the various layers in the work of Husserl and Heidegger will prove challenging. On the 
most general level, we may consider the world as physical reality, encompassing the totality of things 
                                                          
11 Carr, David. Interpreting Husserl. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), 232-34. 
12 Føllesdal, Dagfinn. The Lebenswelt in Husserl. Language, knowledge, and intentionality. Acta Philosophica 
Fennica, Vol. 49 (1990), 123-134. 
13 Smith, David Woodruff. Husserl. (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), 33-38. 
14 Safranski, Rüdiger. Ein Meister aus Deutschland. Heidegger und seine Zeit. (Frankfurt a.M.; Fischer 
Taschenbuch, 2001), 91-92. 
15 Gaston, Sean. The Concept of World from Kant to Derrida. (London: Rowman & Littlefield Group, 2013). 
16 See, for example: Seaman, David, and Mugerauer, Robert (eds.). Dwelling, Place and Environment: Towards a 
Phenomenology of Person and World. (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985). 
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that exist. In a limited sense, this includes the world in which we live our daily lives. Both Husserl and 
Heidegger challenge the unquestioning relation we have to this world, and examine the ways in which 
we build our conception of this world. Our conception of the world is thoroughly informed by 
metaphysics and the natural sciences. As a result, challenging the traditional conception of the world 
for Husserl and Heidegger automatically entails a critique and rethinking of traditional metaphysics 
and the natural sciences. For both philosophers, this critique also calls for the search for new 
foundations. In their search, both Husserl and Heidegger take their starting point in the subject and 
experience, albeit with radically transformed concepts of subject. The turn to the subject raises the 
question how we, as beings in the world, can gain a viewpoint from which to consider the world as a 
whole.17 Additionally, we may ask how the world is created by and for the subject, which touches on 
concepts such as consciousness, perception, and world constitution. These concepts in turn are related 
to questions about subjectivity and objectivity, and the possibility of knowledge of the objective world 
and the objects in it. Questions about the world can also be extended to see how individual worlds are 
influenced by other subjects, and the intersubjective character of the world that we share with other 
subjects. Finally, we can consider the world as the ontological foundation within which human life 
takes place and to which all human acts relate. As we will see, all these different layers of the concept 
of world are intricately related and are difficult to untangle, often for the authors themselves as well.  
  In my treatment I will focus primarily on the concept of object and its relation to the concept 
of world in Husserl and Heidegger. Such a restriction is necessary, since a full discussion of the concept 
of world goes well beyond the scope of my present investigation. Several reasons make the concept 
of object an excellent starting point from which to analyze the concept of world in both thinkers. First 
of all, Husserl considered phenomenology as the study of objects as they are in themselves; i.e., as 
they present themselves in consciousness. With his concept of object Husserl breaks with traditional 
metaphysics, which has great implications for his concept of world. Secondly, Heidegger adopts 
Husserl’s adage “auf die ‘Sachen Selbst’ zurückgehen“ in SuZ as fundamental to the phenomenological 
method, and likewise turns his analysis of the concept of object into a critique of traditional 
metaphysics.18 However, Heidegger’s approach is quite different from that of Husserl, and his critique 
also implicates the work of Husserl, making it one of the central points on which the two differ. Finally, 
for both Husserl as well as Heidegger, the analysis of the concept of object has great implications for 
their concept of subject, and the relation between subject and object. In turn, the concepts of object, 
subject, and how the two relate brings both thinkers to reflect on the concept of world.  
 My paper will have the following structure. In the first chapter I will give an overview of 
                                                          
17 Gaston, The Concept of World, ix. 
18 Heidegger, SuZ, §7. 
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Husserl’s early phenomenology, focusing on the second volume of the Logische Untersuchungen and 
the first volume of Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomnologie und phänomenologische Philosophie. Central 
to my discussion will be Husserl’s conception of consciousness as intentionality, and his concept of 
object. As we will see, Husserl believes that consciousness is always consciousness of something. For 
Husserl, this means that consciousness is always in an intentional relation to objects in a world. I will 
also discuss the épochè as Husserl’s method for studying intentional consciousness. Husserl’s épochè 
aims at nothing less than turning off our natural attitude to the world. As such, one of the explicit aims 
of the épochè is to problematize the concept of world of the natural sciences.  
 In the second chapter, I will discuss Heidegger’s analysis of object and world in SuZ. Contrary 
to Husserl, Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein is not aimed at understanding how we reflect rationally on 
objects. One of the central characteristics of Dasein is to always and already have a world, within which 
it can encounter things. Heidegger’s analysis focusses on the ontological preconditions of the ways in 
which Dasein relates to the objects in its world, in order to come to a better understanding of being. 
In his analysis, Heidegger privileges Dasein’s pre-reflective relations to objects over the way they show 
themselves in theoretical reflection. As such, Heidegger’s analysis goes against the rationalism of the 
western metaphysical tradition and the natural sciences, including the phenomenology of Husserl. 
 In the final chapter, I will look at the late phenomenology of Husserl and his concept of the 
Lebenswelt. In order to find more secure foundations for his phenomenology than his transcendental 
subject would allow, Husserl introduces the concept of Lebenswelt to analyze the ontological 
structures of the world within which we live. The introduction of the Lebenswelt shows the increased 
sophistication with which Husserl came to reflect on the concept of world in his later philosophy. 
Ironically, it also moves Husserl’s philosophy into the direction of the Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein, 
of which he had such misgivings. As I will argue, the reason for the shift in Husserl’s conception of 
world is intrinsic to the project of phenomenology as both Husserl and Heidegger understand it. I hope 
my investigation will help show the importance of the concept of world to phenomenology and 
philosophy. As the critical and unbiased examination of phenomena, phenomenology cannot pass over 
the source of all phenomena; the world itself.   
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Chapter I: The Early Phenomenology of Husserl 
 
I.1 Life and Times of Husserl 
 
Before we discus Husserl’s phenomenology, we do well to situate his work in the intellectual currents 
of his time. Following the work of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), German academic philosophy 
blossomed during the opening decades of the eighteenth century in a movement known as German 
Idealism. However, following Hegel’s death in 1831, the methods of idealist philosophy and speculative 
idealism in particular were highly criticized, leading to its near demise midcentury.19 The stagnation of 
academic philosophy stood in great contrast with the progress of the empirically operating natural 
sciences. Physics, chemistry, and biology were making great advancements, rapidly transforming 
society and intellectual life in Germany. By the 1850’s, the natural sciences had managed to instill an 
ever-growing believe in progress and the ability of mankind to shape its world.20 The success of the 
natural sciences led to a serious crisis for academic philosophy; what role could philosophy possibly 
fulfill in our understanding of the world, now that the methods of Idealist philosophy had been 
discredited, and the empirical sciences were rapidly conquering the world?21  
  By the 1860’s, a growing number of German philosophers believed the answer to lay in 
formulating an epistemology based on the work of Kant. These so-called neo-Kantians believed 
philosophy could provide the empirical sciences with a theory of knowledge or Erkenntnislehre, 
examining their methods and presuppositions.22 The works of the neo-Kantians saw direct application 
in one of the greatest intellectual controversies of nineteenth century Europe, the so-called 
‘materialism controversy’. The central question of the controversy is whether the natural sciences 
inevitably lead to materialism, as some materialists claimed it did. The neo-Kantians were effective in 
blocking the materialist advance by pointing at the dogmatic and naïve way in which the materialists 
posited the existence of physical reality. Additionally, the neo-Kantians pointed at the divide between 
consciousness and matter, which they claimed the materialists would never be able to overcome.23  
  Partly due to their success in combatting the materialists, the neo-Kantianism were successful 
                                                          
19 Gregory, Frederick. Scientific Materialism in Nineteenth Century Germany. (Dordrecht and Boston: D. Reidel 
Publishing Company, 1977), 9. 
20 Ibidem, 2. 
21 Beiser, Frederick Charles. The Genesis of Neo-Kantianism, 1796-1880. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2014), 6. 
22 Ibidem. 
23 Ibidem, 6-7. 
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in securing the position of philosophy among the sciences. Over the following decades, neo-Kantianism 
grew out to become the dominant philosophical current in German universities; a position it would 
retain until the outbreak of the First World War. By the 1880’s, the neo-Kantian movement had 
condensed in three influential schools; the Marburg School under the leadership of Hermann Cohen, 
the Southwestern School of which Wilhelm Windelband and Heinrich Rickert were the most notable 
exponents, and the neo-Frisian School in Göttingen led by Leonard Nelson.24 In the neo-Kantian schools, 
the original conception of philosophy as epistemology was gradually expanded to also include ethics, 
aesthetics, and political philosophy.25  
  It was in these times of great scientific progress that Husserl was born in 1838 in Prossnitz, 
Austria-Hungary, son to a family of converted Jews. At the age of nine he was sent to school in Vienna, 
and completed his high school education in Olmütz in 1876. Upon his graduation Husserl moved to 
Leipzig to study mathematics, astronomy, and physics. It was during his years in Leipzig that he became 
acquainted with the work of Franz Brentano, who would come to play a central role in his philosophical 
development.26  Over the following years, Husserl would combine the study of mathematics with 
philosophy, first in Berlin, and later in Vienna, where he obtained his doctorate in pure mathematics 
in 1882. He subsequently went to Berlin to work as the assistant of Karl Weierstrass, at the time one 
of Germany’s most renowned mathematicians. Although he was working as a mathematician, Husserl 
remained fascinated by philosophical questions. His interest would be reignited after moving back to 
Vienna, where he attended the lectures of Brentano between 1884 and 1886. Brentano introduced 
him to the works of David Hume and his own work on intentionality. Over the following years, these 
influences would play a pivotal role in the development of Husserl’s phenomenology.27  
  By the 1880’s, Husserl had become a respected member of the vibrant Germanophone 
academic- and scientific community. Many of the people Husserl now worked with were concerned 
with the methods and scope of their relatively new disciplines. Men like Hermann von Helmholtz in 
physiology, Wilhelm Wundt in experimental psychology, Weierstrass in mathematics, and Brentano in 
psychology, all attempted to formulate the epistemological and methodological foundations of their 
respective disciplines, with the aim of establishing them as strict, rigorous sciences.28 As we will see 
shortly, Husserl’s work would also be strongly motivated by a search for foundations. The central aim 
of his phenomenology would be to provide philosophy with the method that would allow it to be a 
                                                          
24 Ibidem, 1-2. 
25 Ibidem, 9. 
26 Smith, Husserl, 15. 
27 Ibidem, 16. 
28 Ibidem, 10-11. 
 
Chapter I: The Early Phenomenology of Husserl 
 
10 
 
strict and rigorous science.29  
  Husserl started working on his Habilitationsschrift in Vienna, but after Brentano was forced to 
resign his professorship, Husserl moved to Halle to work under Brentano’s former student Carl Stumpf 
(1848-1936). He completed his Habilitationsschrift in 1887.30 Over the following decade and a half, 
Husserl continued to work on logic and intentionality, which would eventually evolve into 
phenomenology. He published his first book in 1891, titled Philosophie der Arithmetik. Psychologische 
und logische Untersuchungen. The book failed to make a great impression, and received sharp 
criticisms from Gottlob Frege (1848-1925). Frege charged Husserl’s work with psychologism by 
reducing logics and mathematics to psychological acts. The planned second part of Philosophie der 
Arithmetik would never be published. Instead, Husserl took Frege’s criticisms to heart, and spend the 
following decade refining his positions and writing the work that would mean his breakthrough as a 
philosopher; the Logische Untersuchungen (henceforth: LU).31  
 
I. 2 Consciousness as Intentionality 
 
The LU were published in two volumes in 1900 and 1901. In the first volume, titled Prolegomena zur 
reinen Logik, Husserl claims that logic is a practical-normative discipline or Kunstlehre that should 
evaluate the methods of the sciences, and the conditions under which these can be employed 
successfully. As such, logic should serve as the Wissenschaftslehre of the individual scientific disciplines. 
32 Husserl believes that the logic of his time had been led astray by psychologism; the view that logic 
can be reduced to psychology. Husserl spends the larger part of the Prolegomena refuting 
psychologism, before elaborating on his own proposal for a pure logic in the final chapter.33 Although 
the first volume of the LU was highly influential in debates on psychologism, it is the second volume 
Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis that has had the more lasting 
influence. It is in the second volume that Husserl first expounds his phenomenological method as the 
study of consciousness. According to Husserl, all scientific knowledge is formulated in propositions, 
which are expressed in language.34 Even though these propositions follow the rules of logic, the validity 
of which do not depend on human thought, they are also the result of mental acts or Akte. Therefore, 
Husserl claims that the study of these mental acts should be an essential part of any Wissenschaftslehre. 
                                                          
29 Husserl, Ideen I, 1-6. 
30 Smith, Husserl, 16. 
31 Ibidem, 18. 
32 Husserl, Edmund. Die Logische Untersuchungen. (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2009), Vol. I, 25-37. 
33 Ibidem, 230-258. 
34 Husserl, LU Vol. II, 8. 
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Considering the fact that Husserl refuted psychologism in the previous volume, it may appear strange 
that Husserl attributes such a central role to the study of consciousness. However, Husserl’s 
conception of consciousness differs strongly from traditional conceptions.    
  Husserl starts his analysis of consciousness by examining the traditional distinction between 
the object that appears in consciousness, which is typically thought of as belonging to the domain of 
physics, and the consciousness within which the object appears, which is taken to belong to 
psychology.35 According to Husserl, this distinction between subject and object lies at the basis of the 
two most common conceptions of consciousness. First of all, psychology takes consciousness as the 
unity of separate experiences and contents of a psychological individual at any given time. These 
experiences are seen as a relation between an experiencing subject and an external object, in which 
the subject has an experience of this external object. Husserl claims that this conception of experience 
does not hold up to phenomenological inspection. Phenomenological analysis shows that the 
appearing object is present in the experience of appearing. This appearing itself does not appear; it is 
experienced.36 Consequently, subject and object cannot be separated as easily as psychology assumes. 
This is also Husserl’s criticism of the second conception of consciousness, which takes consciousness 
as inner perception, which can take actual experiences as its object. This view has been dominant in 
idealist philosophy ever since Descartes. Husserl does not dispute that the existence of Descartes’ ego 
cogito is self-evident and indisputable. However, he claims it is equally self-evident that the ‘I’ is always 
thinking of something.37   
 So what does Husserl mean when he states that consciousness always contains its object, and 
what is the relation between the two? It is at this point that Husserl’s conception of consciousness as 
intentional experience or intentionales Erlebnis comes into play. Husserl claims that cognitive acts of 
the conscious I are always directed at some object. As such, consciousness is always consciousness of 
something. For example, the cognitive act of judging has something which is judged as its object, just 
as remembering has something that is remembered as its intentional object. It is this “reaching out” 
of consciousness to intentional objects to which Husserl refers when he talks of intentional acts.38 It is 
important to note here that Husserl’s concept of object differs radically from traditional conceptions 
of object. To Husserl, anything that can appear as the content of an intentional experience classifies as 
an object. Therefore, these objects do not necessarily have to be of a physical nature, nor is it even 
necessary that they are “objectively real.” The legendary winged horse Pegasus can just as well be 
present in my consciousness as a living horse I see grazing in a meadow. In other words, intentional 
                                                          
35 Ibidem, 355. 
36 Ibidem, 359. 
37 Ibidem, 368. 
38 Ibidem, 380. 
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acts can have intentional contents that do not correspond to an actual object. In such cases, Husserl 
speaks of intentional content as opposed to intentional object.39 Consciousness is the continuous flow 
or Bewuβtseinsfluss of intentional acts, uniting the diverse experiences into a singular unity through 
time. The phenomenological content of the I is that, which in this continual flow of experiences, forms 
“[…] ein all seinen Inhalt übergreifende Form, die kontinuierlich identisch bleibt, während ihr Inhalt 
beständig wechselt.“40 Although every intentional act is an experience, Husserl claims that not every 
experience is intentional. For example, when we perceive music, it is the song that is played that is the 
intentional object, not musical tones. Nonetheless, non-intentional experiences are necessary for 
intentional experiences, as the latter are built on the former.41   
 
I. 3 Intentional Acts and the World 
 
Now that we have examined Husserl’s conception of consciousness as intentionality, we can 
understand phenomenology as the study of the structures of consciousness. Phenomenological 
analysis requires shifting from the attitude of the empirical sciences to the phenomenological attitude, 
an alteration Husserl would elaborate in his later works as the épochè. Already in the LU Husserl 
forwards what I call a proto-reduction. In the proto-reduction, the phenomenologist “switches off” the 
concepts and assumptions of the empirical sciences, including assumption as to the reality or non-
reality of things (Daseinssetzungen), and studies the structures of inner experiences as they present 
themselves in consciousness. According to Husserl, this yields knowledge that is not only universally 
valid, but also valid a priori.42 For Husserl, this is what elevates his phenomenology over descriptive 
psychology. In the following sections, we will see how Husserl further developed the 
phenomenological reduction in his later work. For now, we must examine in closer detail at Husserl’s 
understanding of intentional acts.  
  As we have seen, Husserl criticizes traditional conceptions of the relation between subject and 
object, and the distinction between the two. So how does he see the relation between intentional acts 
and objects? In some sense, both are distinct, as the same intentional acts can be directed at different 
objects. Inversely, the same object can be represented by different intentional acts; I can perceive the 
Eiffel tower as I stand in front of it, or I can represent it in the act of remembering. Because intentional 
act and intentional object can be thought of separately, they can be studied separately by the 
                                                          
39 Ibidem, 386-387. 
40 Ibidem, 369. 
41 Ibidem, 383. 
42 Ibidem, 412. 
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phenomenologist. On the other hand, it makes no sense to speak of an intentional experience without 
a content, or to say that an object is represented in consciousness without a corresponding intentional 
act. In this sense, intentional act and object are mutually implicative, and are what inextricably bind 
subject and object together. Among intentional acts, Husserl deals priority to representation or 
Vorstellung. According to Husserl, it is an a priori, essential law or Wesensgesetz that every act is 
founded on a representation. As such, only representations can be singular, non-composed acts, and 
inversely every composed act is founded on one or more founding representations. This makes 
representations crucial in the representation of objects in consciousness. According to Husserl, an 
intentional experience “gewinnt überhaupt seine Beziehung auf ein Gegenständliches nur dadurch, 
dass in ihm ein Akterlebnis des Vorstellens präsent ist, welches ihm den Gegenstand v o r s t e l l i g 
macht.”43 What implications does this have for the conscious perception of physical objects? In the 
case an object presents itself in our perception as bodily present, for example when we see a tree, we 
make a representation of this tree. Subsequently, in another act this representation is judged to be. It 
is in this manner that physical objects move from sensory experience to presence in consciousness.44 
  At this point in our investigation we can ask ourselves where the concept of world comes into 
play in Husserl’s phenomenology. Because intentionality binds subject and object together, much of 
the traditional distance between consciousness and the outside world is reduced. Whereas for 
Descartes his existence qua cogitatio was an irrefutable truth, resistant of even the most radical of 
doubt, he could not be equally sure of the existence of the outside world. By pointing out the 
intentionality of consciousness, Husserl shows how absurd such doubts are to the phenomenologist. 
Because consciousness always has intentional relations to intentional objects, it is always and already 
in a relationship to the outside world. As Husserl notes passingly in the LU, “[d]ie Welt […] ist 
nimmermehr Erlebnis des Denkenden. Erlebnis ist das Die-Welt-Meinen, die Welt selbst ist der 
intendierte Gegenstand.” 45  For Husserl, the world is always co-intended (Mitgemeint) in any 
intentional act. As a result, Husserl claims that it makes no sense to question the “reality” or “objective 
being” of the world. Unfortunately, this may also be why Husserl devotes little attention in the LU to 
how the world is constituted for individual consciousness. However, as we will see in the following 
section, the elaboration of his phenomenology would soon require Husserl to consider the concept of 
world in greater detail. 
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I.4 Épochè and the World Thesis 
 
Following the success of LU, Husserl was offered a professorship at the University of Göttingen in 1901, 
where he would remain for the next fifteen years. During his time in Göttingen, Husserl greatly 
elaborated his method for phenomenology, while his phenomenology was rapidly gaining in influence. 
The LU contained a refutation of the work of the Munich psychologist Theodor Lipps. Lipps 
unsuccessfully tried to defend his position in front of his students in 1903, which ironically resulted in 
his students starting a phenomenological circle known as the Munich Circle. Although it took 
considerably longer for Husserl to build up a following in Göttingen, by 1910 an identifiable 
phenomenological circle of gifted students had formed known as the Göttingen Circle, many members 
of which had transferred from Munich.46   
  Despite the growing interest in phenomenological research, Husserl continued to publish his 
ideas sparingly, publishing only one essay in the decade following LU. It would take until 1913 for him 
to present his next major work on phenomenology, the first volume of Ideen zu einen reinen 
Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie (Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology 
and to a Phenomenological Philosophy; henceforth, Ideen I). The main methodological innovation of 
Ideen I is the phenomenological reduction or épochè. Recall that in the LU Husserl claimed that 
phenomenological analysis requires the phenomenologist to “turn off” the assumptions of the 
empirical sciences. Already in the LU Husserl recognized one of the central difficulties of his method; 
the unnatural way of thinking that it requires of the phenomenologist.47 In order to address this 
difficulty Husserl elaborates his reduction in Ideen I, making it the most important methodological tool 
for the phenomenologist. According to Husserl, people live their lives almost exclusively in the natural 
attitude or natürliche Einstellung. The épochè aims at nothing less than turning the natural attitude off, 
and adopting the phenomenological attitude. It is through the épochè that Husserl comes to 
reconsider the concept of world.  
  In the natural attitude, we are aware of a spatio-temporal world, filled with physical objects 
and other beings. Husserl claims that these things are not just present in consciousness; they are more 
properly given with greater or lesser clarity within a horizon, which is always present, and has an 
infinity of obscure possible perceptions. In this manner, we as conscious beings always find ourselves 
in a relation to the world, even though this world constantly changes in content and degree of clarity. 
Contrary to for example the “world of arithmetic”, which is only present when I am thinking 
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arithmetically, the natural world is always present in the natural attitude, and it is within and to this 
world that all the acts of our consciousness relate. Although the world of the natural attitude for 
Husserl is primarily spatio-temporal, it also includes the world of values and the world of practical 
things, among others.48 We share the conception of the world of the natural attitude with the people 
around us, who also live and belong to this world. It is the aim of the empirical sciences to gain a more 
complete and encompassing understanding of this world. The shared general thesis of the natural 
attitude is that this world is always really present.49  
  Inspired by Descartes’ radical doubt, Husserl’s épochè requires “turning off” the world thesis 
of the natural attitude. Contrary to Descartes, the épochè does not question the existence or reality of 
the world. Instead, it entails refraining from judging about the world thesis. Husserl calls this 
“bracketing” or Einklammerung.50 In the épochè, the phenomenologist puts the natural world and all 
that pertains to it between brackets. It is the aim of the phenomenologist to continuously reduce the 
natural world through stepwise reductions, allowing transcendental consciousness to be viewed ever 
more purely.51 It is not the aim to throw the bracketed “things” away, but to study their Gegebenheit, 
i.e., the way they are given in consciousness. For Husserl, judging scientifically means “von den Reden 
und Meinungen auf die Sachen selbst zurückgehen, sie in ihrer Selbstgegebenheit befragen und die 
alle sachfremden Vorurteile beiseite tun.“52 We may ask ourselves what the status of the world is after 
Husserl’s épochè. According to Sean Gaston, “it is important to note that the phenomenological épochè 
is not a suspension of the world itself but of a natural attitude toward that world.”53 Gaston’s assertion 
is correct only to a certain extent. It is true that the aim of the épochè is shaking of the natural attitude. 
However, shaking this requires abstracting practically all what we normally call world, leaving only 
transcendental consciousness and its intentional objects. As such, it Husserl’s épochè in Ideen suspends 
as much of the world as it possibly can.  
  What reveals itself to the phenomenologist after these reductions is the realm of essences. 
This is why Husserl calls his pure phenomenology a science of essences (Wesenswissenschaft) or 
‘eidetic’ science, after the Greek word for essence. 54  According to Husserl, everything has a 
corresponding essence, which makes that thing what it is, and which is subject to essential laws. It is 
the aim of phenomenology to reduce consciousness to its essences in order to examine its essential 
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laws, which Husserl calls the eidetic reduction.55   
  From the previous it should be clear that Husserl’s conception of phenomenology has evolved 
since the LU. In Ideen I, Husserl’s phenomenology takes a transcendental turn by dealing primacy to 
the study of essences, starting from what he calls the pure and transcendental I. The reason to take 
the transcendental I as a starting point is that it is more secure than the world. Husserl claims that the 
world thesis is contingent, as it can always be put in doubt.56 By contrast, the immanent experience of 
the pure I cannot be doubted, meaning that the I is of necessity. The transcendental I does not depend 
on the natural world for its existence, and cannot be reduced phenomenologically like the natural 
world.57 However, because the transcendental I is always in a relation to a transcendent world, it 
makes no sense to doubt that there is a world, even though the existence of any specific world can be 
put in doubt.58  
 
I.5 Perception: Noema & Noese 
 
Our investigation so far still leaves it open how the world is constructed in transcendental 
consciousness. Although Husserl at no point in Ideen I deals with this question explicitly, we can answer 
this question if we look at Husserl’s treatment of perception and time consciousness in Ideen I. Husserl 
warns us that phenomenological time must not be understood as the time of the natural world, and 
cannot be measured as such. According to Husserl, consciousness and our stream of experiences 
(Erlebnisstrom) have three temporal dimensions and horizons, which are related to one another. In 
the stream of experiences a horizon of actual now or aktuelle Jetzt is formed, in which different 
experiences are related by being present simultaneously. Although the content of the actual now 
constantly changes, it is always present and ready to take in new content, and is what constitutes the 
present for the pure I. The actual now is also related to a horizon of past experiences, which is likewise 
always present and changing in content as it takes in experiences that have passed from the actual 
now. Finally, the actual now is also related to a future horizon, in which the actual now finds its 
fulfillment.59 Related to time-consciousness is an act of great interest to phenomenology; that of 
reflection. Reflection can take experiences of the stream of experiences, and keep them present as 
objects of reflection. Likewise, reflection can recall previous experiences in acts of retention, or reflect 
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on those that will come in acts of protention.60 Every act of reflection is a modification of experience. 
It is the task of phenomenology to analyze all the different types and forms of modification, and how 
they relate to the original experience. Husserl claims that object perceptions are the most original 
experiences possible, and therefore are of special interest to the phenomenologist.61 That is why we 
will now turn to his treatment of object perception.  
  Inspired by the Aristotelean doctrine of hylemorphism, Husserl introduces the Greek term hyle 
to designate the sensory data that offers the matter for sense-providing acts. The acts that gives 
sensory data their sense or morphe are noetic moments or noeses, after the Greek word for thought 
nous.62 Every intentional experience has its corresponding noese. Husserl calls anything that can serve 
as the object of noese a noema (plural noemata), which corresponds to Husserl’s concept of intentional 
content or object in the LU. Athough all physical objects have corresponding noemata, these noemata 
themselves are of an ideal nature. As Husserls points out, a physical tree may burn down or decompose, 
but its corresponding noema is unchanging.63 The same noema can be the object of many different 
noeses, and the complete noema of any object consists of many noemata and noematic layers, which 
center on what Husserl calls a noematic core. It is this core which allows the noemata to refer to one 
central concept.64 For example, the direct perception of a tree refers to the same noetic core as my 
memory of the same tree. According to Husserl, it is the noetic core of objects that in the natural 
attitude is understood as the objectivity of objects, but which after the épochè reveals itself as the 
irreducible correlation between noema and noese.65   
  Armed with the concept of noema and noese, we can reconstruct how Husserl analyzes object 
perception (Dingwahrnemung). According to Husserl, sensory perception is by necessity inadequate, 
as every physical object can inspire an infinite number of possible perceptions. By consequence, 
objects can never be given completely to conscioussness. Instead, perception offers adumbrations or 
Abschattungen of objects, which continually show different aspects of the perceived object. 
Adumbrations form noetic chains, through which the same noematic object can be continually given 
in consciousness in varying ways. This allows us to perceive the same tree from different angles and 
distances, while still linking these separate perceptions to the same physical object. Only physical 
objects offer adumbrations; experience by contrast is given as absolute. 66 In this way, adumbration 
demarcates physical- from non-physical objects. Ideal content can be added to the noematic structure, 
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allowing us to relate non-physical properties to the physical objects we perceive. It is through this 
process that we always perceive physical objects as sense-carrying objects.   
  For Husserl, adumbration is not a neutral process, merely linking together individual 
perceptions. Adumbrations anticipate future adumbrations, and lead to certain expectations about 
perceived objects. The various noetic acts which constitute a perceived object in consciousness all 
relate to an “identical X”, which is thought to have “real” existence.67 The noetic expectation can 
subsequently find its confirmation by being presented with the proper hyletic content. For example, 
the noetic expectation that the tree I perceive is real is fulfilled by the hyletic perception of this tree.
  
I.6 The Transcendental Subject and the World 
 
Let us turn once more to the concept of world. Husserl ‘s phenomenology in Ideen I does not concern 
itself with the spatio-temporal world of the natural attitude, which his épochè puts out of play. What 
the épochè reveals is an ideal world of essences over and beyond the natural world, to which 
transcendental consciousness is related and whose essential structures are examined by the 
phenomenologist. The turn to transcendental consciousness brings Husserl to the construction of the 
world in individual consciousness. As we have seen, according to Husserl perception is always 
surrounded by an undetermined and obscure horizon. Objects can come to the foreground as 
attentional acts “shed light” on them, but the obscure and undetermined horizon always remains 
present on the background, influencing our perceptions. 68  The image that Husserl evokes of 
consciousness is that of a flashlight in a dark forest. Consciousness can direct its light to illuminate part 
of its obscure environment, but will never be able to fully eradicate the darkness. Nonetheless, Husserl 
believes that phenomenological analysis over time can shed a light on all the essential structures of 
perception, consciousness, and horizon. The concept of horizon seems to act like the ontological 
ground on which consciousness and object meet, and thus to be of central importance in the 
constitution of world in consciousness. Yet in Ideen I Husserl does not elaborate his concept of horizon 
in this direction to a large extent. As we will see in the following chapter, it was Heidegger who would 
take up the concept of horizon and deal it a central importance in his concept of world. 
  Although Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology greatly elaborates his earlier work, it also 
entails a partial return to traditional metaphysics. Husserl’s concept of intentional consciousness in the 
LU placed the subject in the world by removing much of the distance separating subject and object. By 
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adopting the transcendental ego, Husserl returns to the Idealist tradition, finding inspiration in Plato’s 
theory of ideas, the Aristotelean doctrine of hylemorphism, Descartes ego, and Kant’s transcendental 
idealism. This return to a transcendental idealism in a way increases the distance between subject and 
object that his earlier phenomenology had reduced to a large extent, and retracts his transcendental 
subject from the world. As Rüdinger Safranski puts it, “Husserls transzendentales Ego hat die Welt im 
Kopf, aber dieser Kopf ist nicht mehr recht in der Welt.”69 It would be Heidegger who took it upon him 
to bring the subject back into the world.   
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Chapter II: Dasein & Welt in Heidegger 
 
II.1 The Young Heidegger & Husserl 
 
Martin Heidegger was born in 1889 in Meßkirch, a provincial town in the south of Germany. After 
graduating from the gymnasium of Freiburg in 1909, Heidegger enrolled at the University of Freiburg 
as a student of theology and philosophy. It was during this time that he discovered the philosophy of 
Husserl, for which he immediately felt a strong fascination. For over two years, Heidegger kept a copy 
of the Logische Untersuchungen on loan from the university library, which he studied closely.70 The 
opportunity to work with Husserl presented itself when Husserl transferred to Freiburg in 1916. 
Heidegger expressed his desire to work with Husserl early on, but Husserl remained indifferent at first 
because of Heidegger’s ties to catholic philosophy. Husserl first opened up to Heidegger after his 
personal assistant Edith Stein resigned in 1917, and the two quickly became friends. They maintained 
a cordial correspondence during Heidegger’s military service at a meteorological station. Upon his 
return to Freiburg in the winter of 1918, Heidegger was appointed Privatdozent, and became Husserl’s 
private assistant.71    
  Despite his proximity to Husserl, Heidegger quickly developed a philosophy that differed 
significantly from that of his master. In part, this was due to the different intellectual influences to 
which Heidegger had been exposed. Through his catholic background he was well versed in 
scholasticism, and like Husserl he was also intimately familiar with the works of Brentano and the neo-
Kantians. Contrary to Husserl, Heidegger had also familiarized himself with recent developments in the 
philosophy of life. With Friedrich Nietzsche, he shared a deep resentment for modernism and 
bourgeois society. From Nietzsche, Heidegger learned about the danger of a society dominated by 
science and technology.72 Heidegger was also deeply influenced by the work of the life philosopher 
Wilhelm Dilthey. Dilthey had demarcated the domain of the natural sciences, which attempt to explain 
(erklären) occurrences in nature, from that of the Geisteswissenschaften, which attempt to understand 
(verstehen) expressions of experience. His life project was to formulate a hermeneutical theory that 
could help understand all expressions of human experience.73  
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  Above all else, Heidegger was affected by the needs of his time. German defeat in the First 
World War reverberated throughout German society, plunging the country in great crisis. Needless to 
say, this crisis was intellectual as well. German defeat was seen as a defeat of German Kultur, and neo-
Kantianism declined almost overnight. Traditional theories and worldviews could no longer suffice, and 
never before in German history was the need for a new philosophy and worldview felt more pressingly. 
In the attempts to formulate a new worldview, cultural pessimism abounded, as in Oswald Spengler’s 
highly influential Der Untergang des Abendlandes, the first volume of which was published in 1918.74
  
 
II.2 Philosophy as the Urwissenschaft of the Umwelt 
 
The search for a new beginning is the main theme of Heidegger’s first lecture series after the First 
World War, titled Die Idee der Philosophie und das Weltanschauungsproblem. Students expecting to 
be offered a philosophical worldview were soon to be disappointed. According to Heidegger, his 
conception of philosophy cannot be reconciled with the search for a Weltanschauung, for they have 
incompatible aims. Worldviews are always built on a theoretical understanding of the world, through 
which they attempt to explain occurrences in this world. What Heidegger attempts to uncover is a 
domain prior to all theorizing, and to subsequently formulate the method for investigating this domain. 
The science which deals with this domain is not an epistemology like those of the Neo-Kantians, nor a 
Wissenschaftslehre like that of his master Husserl. Instead, such a science is “Philosophie als 
Urwissenschaft.“75 Heidegger warns us not to underestimate the stakes of his investigation. As he 
states with a penchant for the dramatic that would come to characterize his style of philosophizing; 
Wir stehen an der methodischen Wegkreuzung, die über Leben oder Tod der Philosophie 
überhaupt entscheidet, an einem Abgrund: entweder ins Nichts, d.h. der absoluten Sachlichkeit, 
oder es gelingt der Sprung in eine andere Welt, oder genauer: überhaupt erst in die Welt.76 
What Heidegger means with this coming into the world becomes apparent when he discusses 
Umwelterlebnisse, of which he takes his experience of the lectern in the auditorium as an example. 
What is it that he sees when he sees the lectern? According to Heidegger, it are not perpendicular 
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brown surfaces that he perceives, but the lectern itself. It is also not true that he first perceives brown 
surfaces, which are subsequently perceived as a chest, and finally as the lectern. Instead, “ich sehe das 
Katheder gleichsam in einem Schlag; ich sehe es nicht nur isoliert, ich sehe das Pult als für mich zu hoch 
gestellt.“77 The object lectern has a definite significance as lectern to Heidegger and to all those present 
in the lecture hall, which presents itself immediately. Heidegger asks rhetorically if that significance 
would be the same for a farmer from the Black Forest.78 It is characteristic of the objects in our Umwelt 
to immediately present themselves in the significance they have to us:  
In dem Erlebnis des Kathedersehens gibt sich mir etwas aus einer unmittelbaren Umwelt. Dieses 
Umweltliche […] sind nicht Sachen mit einem bestimmten Bedeutungscharakter, Gegenstände, 
und dazu noch aufgefaβt als das bedeutend, sondern das Bedeutsame ist das Primäre, gibt sich 
mir unmittelbar, ohne jeden gedanklichen Umweg über ein Sacherfassen. In einer Umwelt 
lebend, bedeutet es mir überall und immer, es ist alles welthaft, »es weltet«[…].79 
It are the experiences in the Umwelt themselves that create a world full of objects that have a 
significance that is directly given. These experiences are not simple processions of singular experiences, 
strung together. For Heidegger, experiences are Ereignisse or occurrences, which take on significance 
in the situation in which they occur, in correspondence with their nature.80 The analysis of the lectern 
as an example of an Umwelterlebnis has brought Heidegger to the constitution of world for the subject. 
It is the lectern itself that weltet; it collects an entire world of meaning around it. This “es 
weltet“ always involves an I; It is only in relation to this I that something umweltliches takes on its full 
significance. Heidegger claims that when the I reflects theoretically on an object, it does not involve 
the complete I. As a result, the theorizing I does not live in relation to the worldly object it reflects 
upon.81 What has started as an analysis of Umwelterlebnisse is now turning into a critique of theorizing. 
 Heidegger’s analysis becomes truly radical when he turns to the question of the reality of the 
outside world. According to Heidegger, arguments in this question have either sided with a realist 
position, inspired by Aristotle, or that of transcendental idealism, championed by Kant. What both 
positions have in common is that they absolutize theorizing, making them blind to the Umwelt. By 
focusing exclusively on the question what type of a thing something is, traditional metaphysics 
abstracts things out of the lifeworld and their significance to the I, and objectify them. In this manner, 
“[d]as Umwelt-erleben ist ent-lebt bis auf den Rest: ein Reales als solches erkennen.“82 In such a 
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context, the question about the reality of these things may become poignant. However, the question 
about the reality of the outside world is nonsensical in light of the umwelt; it is only a problem in 
theorizing. For the same reason it also not true that the Umwelt presupposes the existence of the 
outside world, because presupposing pertains to the realm of theorizing, not to that of the Umwelt. 
Heidegger claims that we live our lives primarily through Umwelterlebnisse, while we only theorize on 
occasion. Even so, the philosophical tradition has focused almost exclusively on theorizing, neglecting 
the Umwelt. 83 With the Umwelt, Heidegger believes to have found the primordial realm that he set 
out to uncover.   
   It is here that the true challenge starts for Heidegger. For what can the method of philosophy 
as the Urwissenschaft of the Umwelt be, now that theorizing in the traditional sense has been ruled 
out? For Heidegger, it is that clear it cannot be a phenomenology in line with that of Husserl. Husserl’s 
phenomenology deals a central role to reflection, which is also theorizing. What Heidegger proposes 
instead is to adopt a fundamental attitude, in which we refrain from theorizing in the traditional way, 
and study events as they present themselves.84 At first sight, Heidegger’s method may seem analogous 
to adopting the phenomenological attitude through the épochè. However, Heidegger’s attitude differs 
in two fundamental ways. First of all, Heidegger has defined experience as occurrence. Therefore, his 
method aims to study events, not things, as they present themselves. Secondly, and related to the first 
point, this also excludes the possibility of taking the transcendental I of Husserl as a starting point, as 
the conscious I is already taken out of the situation and theorized.  
  Heidegger’s philosophy is evolving rapidly at this time. In the lecture series Grundprobleme der 
Phänomenologie of the following semester, he continues to develop phenomenology as 
Urwissenschaft. The central orientation of his phenomenology is now turning to what Heidegger calls 
factual life or Faktischen Leben. Phenomenology has to make insightful, how we live our daily lives in 
the world, which he calls factual living. He distinguishes not only between the Umwelt that we have 
discussed, but also between an internal Selbstwelt, and an intersubjective Mitwelt. These worlds 
together form what Heidegger at this point calls the Lebenswelt; a term he would subsequently drop 
from his philosophical vocabulary.85 Towards the end of the lecture series, he raises a question that 
would become central not just to his concept of world, but to his philosophy as a whole. “Was ich da 
erfahre, ist faktisch wirklich – existiert. Welches ist der Sinn dieser »Existenz«?“ 86  According to 
Heidegger, it is that all experience is always characterized as having a significance or Bedeutsamkeit. 
Just as the lectern had a significance to Heidegger, every experience has a significance in the totality 
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of experience. This significance is immediate, and has no barriers. Heidegger has placed his 
phenomenological subject firmly back into the world.   
 
II.3 Fundamentalontologie as the Method for Phenomenology 
 
Heidegger’s fame spread quickly, and by 1920 he was considered for a professorate at the University 
of Marburg. His reputation at this point was mostly based on his skills as teacher, as he had published 
very little, which is why in the end he was passed over. Heidegger was once again considered when 
the faculty had to fill another professorate in 1922. Paul Natorp asked Heidegger whether he was 
working on a publication that could help better his chances. Heidegger quickly pieced together a book 
from his studies on Aristotle, and sent these to Marburg. The work made such an impression that 
Heidegger was appointed professor in the summer of 1923.87 Heidegger spend the following years 
elaborating his philosophy, spending much time in his secluded cabin in Todtnauberg and publishing 
little. By 1925 the faculty of Marburg grew uneasy, and threatened to strip Heidegger of some of his 
privileges if he did not publish something soon. Nicolai Hartmann pleaded on Heidegger’s behalf, which 
appeased the faculty. However, by 1926 the minister of culture sent a letter to the faculty in Marburg, 
stating that he could not confirm Heidegger’s nomination as professor due to his lack of significant 
publications. Heidegger intensified his efforts in order to finish the manuscript of Sein und Zeit quickly. 
When the work finally came out in 1927, it made a tremendous impact and secured Heidegger’s 
confirmation by the ministry.88  
  SuZ was part of a larger project Heidegger envisaged, but never completed. The central aim of 
SuZ is to investigate the question of the meaning of being, interpreted from the perspective of time. 
Heidegger claims such an investigation is necessary because Western philosophy has lost touch with 
the question of being. According to Heidegger, metaphysics has long confused things that are 
(Seienden) with being itself (Sein). However, “[d]as Sein des Seienden »ist« nicht selbst ein Seiendes.“89 
Heidegger calls the difference between beings and being the ontological difference (ontologische 
Differenz). By neglecting the ontological difference, traditional metaphysics suffers from what 
Heidegger calls the oblivion of being or Seinsvergessenheit. Nonetheless, as human beings we already 
have a relation to our own being, and a certain understanding of being or Seinsverständnis. Heidegger 
uses the term Dasein to refer to those beings that are and can be concerned with their own being, and 
that have an understanding of being. This understanding is what makes Dasein an ontological being; 
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i.e., a being that has a relation to being. For this reason, Dasein is both interested in the question of 
the meaning of being, as well as forming the best starting point for the investigation of this question. 
Heidegger uses the term Existenz for all the ways and modes in which Dasein can relate to being. This 
Existenz is characterized by being both ontological as well as what Heidegger calls ontic. The ontic 
relates to the realm of beings. In daily life, Dasein answers questions of its own being through existing 
ontically, which leads to an existenzielle understanding of the beings around it. On the other hand, 
questioning the ontological structure of what constitutes Existenz aims at understanding the 
existenzialen of Dasein, the complete structure of which Heidegger calls Existenzialität. It is the aim of 
Heidegger’s fundamental ontology to analyze the existential structure of Dasein, which in turn will help 
gain a better understanding of being.90 For Heidegger there can be no doubt that phenomenology 
offers the only viable method for his fundamental ontology. To him, phenomenology is not so much a 
set of doctrines as a method, allowing things to be examined as they show themselves, free of any 
theoretical assumptions and arbitrary constructs.91 What is it that phenomenology allows to show 
itself? Something which tends to remain obscure; “das Sein des Seienden.”92 In the lecture series Die 
grundprobleme der Phänomenologie of 1927, Heidegger formulates the implication this has for his 
conception of Husserl’s épochè: 
Für Husserl ist die phänomenologische Reduktion […] die Methode der Rückführung des 
phänomenologischen Blickes von der natürliches Einstellung des in die Welt der Dinge und 
Personen hineinlebenden Menschen auf das transzendentale Bewuβtseinsleben und dessen 
noetisch-noematiche Erlebnisse, in denen sich die Objekte als Bewuβtseinskorrelate 
konstituieren. Für uns bedeutet die phänomenologische Reduktion die Rückführung des 
phänomenologischen Blickes von der wie immer bestimmten Erfassung des Seienden auf das 
Verstehen des Seins (Entwerfen auf die Weise seiner Unverborgenheit) dieses Seienden.93  
Where for Husserl the phenomenological reduction reveals the domain of transcendental 
consciousness, for Heidegger the reduction allows for the examination and understanding of being 
itself. In other words, for Heidegger the phenomenological reduction entails shifting our view from 
beings to being itself, in order to describe its ontological structures.   
  Heidegger calls the method he uses for this phenomenological construction. 
Phenomenological construction takes its point of departure in beings, the understanding of which is 
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always tainted by traditional modes of viewing things. Therefore, the reduction entailed in 
phenomenological construction by necessity entails a passage through and destruction of traditional 
concepts, before a more adequate understanding can be constructed. 94  The difficulty in 
phenomenological construction is that many phenomena are obscured. Phenomena can be 
undiscovered, or discovered only to have been covered up again, or previously discovered but 
misrepresented. Therefore, phenomenological analysis requires securing the right point of departure, 
which is closely related to securing the right access to phenomena.95  
 According to Heidegger, the aim of phenomenology is to reveal things as they are in 
themselves. For Husserl, such revealing entails the description of the essential structures of things. To 
Heidegger, the phenomenology of Dasein means revealing of the modes in which Dasein relates and 
understands being. Such revealing must move beyond description, and take on the character of an 
explanation, for which the Greeks used the term hermeneuon. This is why Heidegger also refers to his 
fundamental ontology as hermeneutical phenomenology.96  
  Like his teacher Husserl, Heidegger also reflects on the relationship between his philosophy 
and the empirical sciences. According to Heidegger, the individual positive sciences describe beings, 
naively presupposing being itself to be self-evident. In doing so, they pass over the ontological 
structures of their fields of inquiry, which are given in the prescientific experience of our daily lives. 
The sciences may be highly successful with their ontic descriptions of being, Heidegger claims that the 
true advancements of the sciences are made through the revision of their fundamental concepts. 
Therefore, ontological investigations like his own have priority over the ontic investigations of the 
positive sciences.97   
 
II.4 Dasein as In-der-Welt-sein 
 
So what is Heidegger’s point of access in his analysis of Dasein? It is the insight that Dasein is always 
characterized by In-der-Welt-sein. The connecting dashes indicate that for Heidegger this is a unitary 
phenomenon. To Heidegger, it means more than acknowledging that Dasein is always spatially located 
within a physical world, which is an ontic observation of modest profundity. Rather, it is to say that 
Dasein is always ontologically characterized by In-Sein; by being situated within and relating to a world 
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with which it is familiar, and within which it can come across objects. It is only on condition of its In-
der-Welt-sein that things can have spatiality for Dasein. In-der-Welt-sein is an existential of Dasein, 
which cannot be attributed to other beings such as rocks.98 Over the course of his analysis, Heidegger 
will come to define Dasein as a gewurfene Entwurf; i.e, a being that is thrown into the world and its 
own existence, from which it constructs itself out of the possibilities that it encounters. Dasein can 
only do so by possessing a certain openness to being and the possibilities it encounters. Because these 
possibilities show Dasein a potential future, the future is the most important temporal modality for 
Heidegger in understanding how Dasein relates to being. Discussing all these themes in SuZ will take 
us well beyond the scope of this paper. Let us therefore once more turn our attention to the concepts 
of world and object.  
  Heidegger points out that his concept of In-der-Welt-Sein differs sharply from the metaphysical 
tradition. This is especially the case for the subject-object relation, and the way in which the subject 
can have knowledge of the outside world. Traditional metaphysics has always conceived of this 
knowing of the world in terms of the subject-object relation, in which a knowing subject has knowledge 
of an object in an external world. This in turn raises the question, how the subject can transcend itself, 
and come into a relation to the outside world. However, this view passes over the fact that Dasein can 
only take on such a relation because it is already characterized ontologically by its In-der-Welt-sein.99 
What is also ignored in traditional metaphysics is that knowing or theorizing is itself a distinct mode in 
which Dasein can relate to beings in the world. Theorizing aims its sight exclusively to the appearance 
or eidos of beings, and defines these beings according to their appearance. It is not true that Dasein 
first reaches out into the outside world when viewing things theoretically, “sondern es ist seiner 
primären Seinsart nach immer schon »drauβen« bei einem begegnenden Seienden der je schon 
entdeckten Welt.“100 In other words, Dasein can only reflect theoretically on beings because it is 
already in a pre-reflective relation to these beings within an already familiar and discovered world. It 
are these pre-reflective relations to beings and being that define Dasein in its daily life, and which 
Heidegger wants to explore. Traditional metaphysics, by focusing exclusively on the theoretical way of 
viewing and relating to objects, has not been able to adequately grasp these pre-reflective relations. 
This is also why Heidegger cannot adopt Husserl’s phenomenology without modification. As an eidetic 
science, Husserl’s phenomenology is equally oriented on theorizing, making it blind to other ways in 
which Dasein can relate to being and beings in the world.   
  Because traditional metaphysics has been blind to the In-der-Welt-sein of Dasein, Heidegger 
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claims that it has been unable to adequately describe the phenomenon world. With the recognition of 
Dasein as In-der-Welt-sein, the challenge presents itself to find the ontological structure of world, and 
to define the concept of worldliness (Weltlichkeit), which Heidegger sets out to do in chapter three of 
SuZ.101 In line with his method, Heidegger starts by examining some traditional conceptions of world. 
Traditional metaphysics, tracing back to Greek ontology, has often equated world with nature. 
However, according to Heidegger, nature is itself a being that is encountered in the world, and as such 
cannot show the full ontological content of world. Nor is the traditional conception of world as the 
collection of all things that ontically are adequate to understand world and worldliness. Neither the 
ontic analysis of beings in the world, nor the ontological interpretation of the being of these beings 
can show the phenomenon world. Instead, Heidegger takes world “als das, »worin« ein faktisch Dasein 
als dieses »lebt«.”102 This conception of world can be understood ontologically as worldliness, and is 
what Heidegger is ultimately after in his analysis. However, he chooses to analyze this conception 
ontically, which will later help him understand the phenomenon world in its ontological meaning. 
Heidegger warns us not to interpret his definition in line with traditional ontology, which would 
interpret his concept of worldliness as belonging to things present “within” the world. Worldliness is a 
part of In-der-Welt-sein, and thus belongs exclusively to the existential structure of Dasein.  
  The point of access that Heidegger chooses for his analysis of worldliness is that of the 
“alltäglichen In-der-Welt-seins, das wir auch den Umgang in der Welt und mit dem innerweltlichen 
Seienden nennen.“ 103  The world that is nearest in daily life is the previously discussed Umwelt. 
Heidegger uses the term Besorgen for all these ways in which Dasein can relate to things in its Umwelt 
that are not Dasein. Besorgen is related to Sorge, which is the complete structure of ways in which 
Dasein can relate to beings in its In-der-Welt-sein. The phenomenological question of worldliness is 
understanding how Dasein can encounter beings in its Umwelt, and understand the being of the beings 
that it encounters. So what is it that Dasein encounters in daily life? Once again, Heidegger takes his 
starting point in the common answer to this question; “things.” The word the ancient Greeks used for 
things is pragmata; “das, womit man es im besorgenden Umgang (praxis) zu tun hat.”104 Central to the 
Greek understanding of pragmatic things was the object as the product of fabrication or as mere object, 
which shows itself as its eidos to the theoretic gaze. However, this way of viewing things fails to bring 
their pragmatic character to light.105  
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II.5 Zeug & Signs  
 
Pragmatic objects are characterized by being related to a totality of useful objects. Heidegger uses the 
word Zeug for pragmatic objects, which in German has no singular, and therefore implies a multitude. 
One Zeug strictly speaking does not exist; it is always related to a Zeugganzes, which allows it to be 
what it is. Zeug has the structure of Um-zu, just as a hammer is “to hammer.” The structure of Um-zu 
is that of a reference of something to something. When we use an object, we have an intuitive 
knowledge of these references. For example, when we use a hammer to hammer, we have an intuitive 
understanding of the references of the hammer. When we hammer with the hammer, the hammer 
reveals itself to us and we relate to it more originally than when we merely stare at it theoretically. 
Heidegger calls this way of relating to things Zuhandenheit. By contrast, when we reflect theoretically 
on things, things reveal themselves in their Vorhandenheit. This way of viewing isolates Zeug from their 
references, and represents them as mere objects.106 With his differentiation between Zuhandenheit 
and Vorhandenheit, Heidegger breaks with traditional ontology, which has always tried to understand 
the concepts of world, subject, and object by studying them theoretically in their Vorhandenheit. 
Zuhandenheit is ontologically prior to Vorhandenheit. It is only because Dasein is already ontologically 
defined by being familiar to a world, to which it is related and within which it can encounter things, 
that it can study things in their Vorhandenheit. This is why Heidegger’s position cannot be called 
subjective or anti-rationalist in the traditional sense; rather, his analysis is ontologically prior to any 
such differentiations.   
             Zuhandenheit has its own way of seeing which differs from the theoretical gaze; that of the 
Umsicht, which is open to the references of things within the Umwelt, and makes these accessible to 
Dasein. Heidegger claims that in our daily interactions with things, we are not focused on them in the 
mode of Vorhandenheit, but on the work in which we use them. In this way, the hammer recedes in 
our hammering, all the while remaining within the reference structure of the work in which we use it. 
Traditional metaphysics has mistakenly attempted to find the “an sich” of things in some aspect of 
their Vorhandenheit. Heidegger claims that the true an-sich-sein of a Zeug is the manner in which it 
recedes when it is used and nothing distorts this use.107 We may think that the Zuhandenheit only 
refers to pragmatic things we find in the workplace, but according to Heidegger it applies to all things 
in the world of Dasein. Nature is discovered with and in light of the references of the Umwelt as 
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Umweltnatur. For example, a stream is discovered as a potential supplier of hydraulic energy.108 This 
conception of nature would become central to Heidegger’s later study of the essence of technology.109  
                 We may well ask how the foregoing relates to the phenomenon world. We have seen that 
the structure of being of the Zuhandene as Zeug is that of a reference. It is only when a Zuhandene has 
a distortion in its references that we become aware of the role that it plays and the use that it has in 
the totality of references. For example, when we want to hammer but we find that the hammerhead 
is broken, the hammer is no longer in the mode of Zuhandenheit, but we become aware of it in the 
mode of Vorhandenheit through the failure of its references. According to Heidegger, this failure lights 
up the totality of structures, and it is with this lighting up that the world reveals itself.110 The world can 
only reveal itself if it has already been disclosed in some way. And indeed, in daily life Dasein is already 
familiar with the world. The question now turns to understanding this familiarity, and how it can reveal 
the worldliness of the beings that Dasein encounters within the world.   
               In order to answer this question, Heidegger turns to the phenomenon of reference. In his 
analysis, he takes signs as an example, which are Zeug with the Um-zu “to refer.” The function of signs 
is to bring something to our attention, which usually remains unnoticed. According to Heidegger, the 
referring of signs must not be understood primarily as the ontic relation between two things. Rather, 
because signs are Zeug, they are part of the totality of references. Signs can only refer because they 
are ontologically part of this totality, and it is with this referring within the totality that the worldliness 
of Zuhandenes reveals itself. In this way, signs can make the totality of references light up in a positive 
sense. Signs reveal Dasein “»worin« man lebt, wobei das Besorgen sich aufhält, welche Bewandtnis es 
damit hat“, 111  allowing Dasein an orientation within the world. The full meaning of the term 
Bewandtnis is almost impossible to translate into English, and is further complicated by the fact that 
Heidegger uses the term in the various different meanings it can have in German. The translation that 
perhaps comes closest to Heidegger’s intention is the word “involvement.” Which specific Bewandtnis 
Dasein has with a Zuhandenes is always derived from the totality of involvements or the 
Bewandtnisganzheit. The Bewandtnisganzheit itself does not have a Bewandtnis, but is a part of 
Dasein.112  
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II.6 Die Weltlichkeit der Welt 
 
Having clarified the concept of reference, Heidegger can now turn to the question how Dasein can 
encounter Zuhandenes. As we have seen, it is part of Dasein as In-der-Welt-sein to have a world in 
which it can encounter things. The question Heidegger now raises is “wie kann Welt zuhandenes 
Begegnen lassen?“113 Because world is a part of Dasein, this question amounts to asking what the 
ontological conditions are for Dasein to be able to encounter Zuhandenes. According to Heidegger, 
Dasein can only encounter and have a Bewandtnis with Zuhandenes when the Bewandtnisganzheit 
itself has already been disclosed. This uncovering requires Dasein to let things be as they are, which 
Heidegger calls bewenden lassen. It is only when Dasein allows things to be as they are that it can have 
a Bewandtnis with them and to them, allowing them to be encountered within the world in their 
Zuhandenheit.   
  Dasein is capable of disclosing the world, because its capacity to understand being allows it to 
understand its own In-der-Welt-sein, which includes understanding the world. What does this 
understanding of In-der-Welt-sein amount to? It is that Dasein lets itself be referred to the Bewandtnis 
of the things that it encounters. The “where” within which Dasein lets itself be referred is what 
Heidegger calls the phenomenon world. The structure “to which” Dasein is referred, is what Heidegger 
calls the worldliness of the world. Dasein is always already familiar with the structure of worldliness, 
which relates and refers Dasein to beings, and which always has a significance to it. This is why 
Heidegger calls the totality of Dasein’s relations within and to the world Bedeutsamkeit, which is 
equivalent to the structure of the phenomenon world itself.114  
  Let us briefly summarize Heidegger’s analysis. Heidegger started his analysis of world and 
worldliness by looking at the way in which Dasein interacts with beings in the world in daily life. This 
led him to redefine ‘things’ as Zeug, which are used in praxis in the mode of Zuhandenheit, and are 
characterized by being part of a structure of references. The ontological condition allowing Dasein to 
discover and use things in their Zuhandenheit is that these references are disclosed and accessible to 
Dasein in the Umsicht. The total structure of references and significations is what constitutes the 
phenomenon world; the fact that Dasein can understand the references of beings within the world is 
what constitutes worldliness. World and worldliness are part of the structure of Dasein; without Dasein 
there can be no world.  
  There is one aspect of world in Heidegger that we have not discussed so far; the intersubjective 
world. Heidegger analyzes intersubjectivity in the fourth chapter of SuZ. According to Heidegger, it is 
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an existential of Dasein to be among other Dasein; a phenomenon he calls Mitdasein. In daily life, these 
others dominate Dasein, and dictate the ways in which Dasein relates to being and beings. What this 
shows for Heidegger is that Dasein has the unique capacity to not be itself. So who is Dasein in daily 
life? Husserl claims that it is der Man, the anonymous mass into which Dasein dissolves. Der Man 
dictates mediocrity, and dominates Dasein’s self-understanding and its relation to and interpretation 
of the world. As such, der Man is the primary reason why Dasein has an inauthentic relation to itself 
and being. 115  Heidegger’s negative view of intersubjectivity has often been taken to explain the 
political views he developed during the 1930’s.116  I argue that it is also crucial in understanding 
Heidegger’s view of the empirical sciences. Since the empirical sciences inform the way in which der 
Man views the world and things in it, they cannot help Dasein reach a more authentic understanding 
of being.  
   Heidegger’s analysis of the concept of world differs sharply from the one of Husserl that we 
discussed in the previous chapter. For one, this is due to Heidegger’s rejection of the transcendental 
ego and Husserl’s conception of intentional consciousness. For Heidegger, our experience of things 
and the world is not primarily intentional. It is characteristic of Dasein to possess an openness to being, 
which allows it to encounter beings within its world. Furthermore, unlike Husserl, Heidegger is not 
interested in the question how we can obtain objective knowledge of things and the world. It is the 
desire of the sciences for objective knowledge that has contributed above all else to the oblivion of 
being and Dasein’s inauthentic relation to itself. Gaining a better understanding of being requires 
remaining open to being, and can never result in a definitive system of scientific truths about being 
and beings. As a result, it is hard to see how Heidegger’s fundamental ontology could inform the 
epistemology of the objective sciences.  
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Chapter III: Husserl, der Ewige Anfänger  
 
III.1 Husserl, Heidegger, & the Phenomenological Movement 
 
Immediately after submitting the manuscript for the first volume of the Ideen in 1912, Husserl 
continued writing out the second and third volumes.117 Despite working on these volumes for the 
better part of two decades, they would never be published during his lifetime. Husserl had a habit of 
constantly revising his drafts, clearing very little for publication, which was part of the reason why Edith 
Stein resigned as Husserl’s assistant in 1917. Despite Husserl’s reluctance in publishing his works, the 
phenomenological circles of Göttingen and Munich were thriving during these years, and were gaining 
influence in German universities. In 1912 Husserl and some of his compatriots from the Göttingen and 
Munich Circles founded the Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Phänomenologische Forschung, the first 
edition of which featured Ideen I. The journal helped phenomenologists to disseminate their work, and 
between 1913 and 1930 the journal featured many important publications, including Sein und Zeit.118 
 Notwithstanding these advances in the phenomenology, Husserl’s philosophy had started to 
fall from grace within the phenomenological circles. Few phenomenologists of the Göttingen Circle 
were willing to follow the transcendental turn his phenomenology had taken in Ideen I. Many of them 
were shocked to see Husserl abandon the realist stance of the LU for the transcendental idealism of 
Ideen I. Husserl for his part did not approve of the work of the Circle, as they seemed to prefer the 
piecemeal study of physical objects over the systematic study of the essential structures of 
transcendental consciousness. If there is one philosopher who can be considered to represent the 
Göttingen Circle during these years, it is not Husserl but his former student Adolf Reinach. Some of the 
Circles most notable members, including Alexandre Koyé and Edith Stein, credited Reinach over 
Husserl as their teacher in phenomenology. 119   
  Even so, Ideen I further cemented Husserl’s reputation as a philosopher, and in 1916 he was 
appointed as the successor of Rickert in Freiburg. The war years proved difficult for Husserl and the 
phenomenological movement. Academic life was severely disrupted as many students were called to 
the front, and many faculties closed down altogether. Adolf Reinach perished at the front in 1917 at 
the young age of thirty-four, which according to Hans Spiegelberg caused the Göttingen Circle to 
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demise over the following years.120 One of Husserl’s sons shared Reinach’s fate, while his other son 
was severely injured. It was in these difficult times that Husserl became acquainted with Heidegger, 
with whom he quickly developed an intimate bond. Regardless of the differences in age and stature, 
Husserl considered Heidegger as his philosophical peer, and felt stimulated by their cooperation. 
Inversely, Heidegger benefited greatly from his proximity to Husserl in the development of his own 
philosophy. Not only did it give Heidegger access to the many unpublished manuscripts Husserl was 
working on during this time, Husserl also actively commended Heidegger in Marburg, which no doubt 
helped Heidegger obtain a position there in 1923.121  
  Nonetheless, by this time Heidegger had already started to secretly rebel against his master. 
During the same period in which Heidegger was considered for his position in Marburg, Husserl was 
offered a prestigious professorship in Berlin. In a letter to their mutual friend Karl Jaspers, Heidegger 
mocked Husserl for zealously preaching his transcendental phenomenology, which nobody seemed to 
understand. He voiced his amazement at the fact that Husserl was being considered in Berlin, while 
Husserl’s students in Freiburg were bored by the trivialities he was constantly uttering.122 Heidegger 
was smart enough not to voice such contemptuous remarks openly. But there can be no doubt that 
during these years, Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology was no longer in vogue. By the mid- 
twenties, Husserl’s former student Max Scheler was the shining star of phenomenology, succeeded by 
Heidegger after the publication of SuZ. The thorough and cautious Husserl had little respect for the 
immense output of the flamboyant Scheler, and likewise had misgivings about the direction in which 
Heidegger’s philosophy had developed. In a letter in 1931 Husserl referred to both men as his two 
philosophical antipodes.123 Even so, Husserl continued his support for Heidegger. When he was asked 
to suggest a successor for his professorship upon his retirement, he did not hesitate to unequivocally 
commend his former assistant. It was thus that Heidegger returned to Freiburg in 1928 to succeed his 
former master. 124  
  Despite his emeritus, Husserl continued to work fervently on his phenomenology. For much of 
1928, he worked with Heidegger on an encyclopedia entry on phenomenology for the Encyclopedia 
Britannica, while at the same time studying SuZ. The cooperation proved very difficult, and over the 
course of many drafts and discussions Husserl began to realize just how much he and his disciple had 
drifted in different philosophical directions.125 Husserl would never again touch the manuscripts of the 
                                                          
120 Ibidem. 
121 Cristin, Renato. Phänomenologische Ontologie. Heideggers Auseinandersetzung mit Husserl (1916-1928). 
Heidegger-Jahrbuch 6 (2012), 44-45. 
122 Safranski, Ein Meister aus Deutschland, 150. 
123 Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement, 228-230. 
124 Safranski, Ein Meister aus Deutschland, 202.  
125 Renato, Phänomenologische Ontologie, 44-48. 
 
Das Sein der Welt. Husserl and Heidegger on the Concept of World 
 
35 
 
second and third volumes of Ideen, but published a book on logic in 1929. That he was still considered 
a philosopher of great stature is attested to by the fact that the Académie Française invited him to 
present his philosophy in a series of lectures. Husserl accepted the invitation, and in February 1929 he 
held two lectures at the Sorbonne in Paris under the title Einleitung in die Phenomenologie.126 The 
Sorbonne lectures resulted in the book the Cartesianische Meditationen, first published in French in 
1931. The work would only be published in German in 1950, long after Husserl’s death. Although 
Husserl intended the lectures as an introduction to his transcendental phenomenology, they show the 
novel directions in which his phenomenology had been developing since Ideen I. 
 
III.2 Ontology and Self-constitution in the Cartesianische Meditationen 
 
As the title of the book indicates, Husserl reengages with the philosophy of René Descartes in offering 
an introduction to his own transcendental phenomenology. Husserl credits Descartes’ Meditations for 
inspiring the transcendental turn in his own phenomenology, going so far as to say that that his 
transcendental phenomenology may also be called a neo-Cartesianism. At the same time, Husserl 
points out that transcendental phenomenology, precisely because it radically investigates Cartesian 
themes, is forced to reject almost all doctrines of Cartesian philosophy.127 Husserl’s interpretation of 
Descartes has been widely debated, and will not be discussed here in greater detail. Instead, I will focus 
on new developments in Husserl’s phenomenology, especially with regards to his conception of world 
and world constitution.128  
  The first four of the five meditations that make up the Cartesianische Meditationen offer an 
introduction to Husserl’s phenomenology in line with Ideen I. One thing that immediately becomes 
clear to the reader of the Cartesianische Meditationen is that Husserl is unwilling to give up the 
transcendental ego as the foundation of his transcendental phenomenology.129 Even so, it is clear that 
Husserl’s thought has evolved on some points since Ideen I. One of the questions that Husserl considers 
in greater detail is that of the self-constitution of the transcendental subject to itself, which Husserl 
now recognizes as the central question of phenomenology.130 As we will see, the consideration of this 
question shifts Husserl’s phenomenology from an epistemological approach to a more ontological 
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approach. For the early Husserl, the main purpose of phenomenology is to describe the structures of 
intentional consciousness. The aim of this description is to establish phenomenology as a strict science 
among the sciences, for which it could serve as an epistemology. This aim remained unchanged despite 
Husserl’s transcendental turn in Ideen I. By contrast, Heidegger’s interest from the start had been to 
understand the ontological structures of human existence, which he aimed to elucidate with his 
analysis of Dasein. The fact that Husserl now acknowledges an ontological question as central to 
phenomenology is indicative of the transformation his phenomenology is undergoing during these 
years; a transformation that brings Husserl closer to Heidegger’s phenomenology.  
  By considering the ontological structures of the transcendental ego and the question of its self-
constitution, Husserl becomes more perceptive to the question of world constitution for the ego. 
According to Husserl, the ego is always surrounded by an Umwelt, in which it is aware of things that 
are and that have a meaning to it, or of things that it may come to know. It is through acts of positing 
and sense-giving of things in the Umwelt that the ego comes to have a world. According to Husserl, it 
is part of the ontological structure of the ego to always have a world, within which it can encounter 
objects. As such, Husserl’s analysis has strong similarities with Heidegger’s concept of In-Sein. In the 
way in which the ego encounters objects, Husserl differentiates between active and passive genesis. 
When we encounter things in daily life, they are primarily given to us passively as what they are in 
themselves. However, even in passive genesis things are always given with a corresponding sense. 
Objects are subsequently actively modified, and presented as the meaning carrying objects of which 
we become aware. It is through these acts of genesis that the ego continuously constitutes itself. 
Husserl introduces the Leibnizian term Monade to refer to the totality of the ego. Husserl borrows the 
term Monade from Leibniz, and uses it to designate a unity, that is itself nonetheless composed of 
several separate unities. In this way Husserl accounts for the paradoxical way in which the ego remains 
itself as an indivisible subject, while being composed out of the constantly changing experiences it 
derives from the Umwelt.131  
  Passive and active Genesis show an essential law of the transcendental ego; thanks to passive 
genesis, the ego is always surrounded by “things” with which it can acquaint itself, and which always 
carry a sense for it. Husserl therefore concludes that even things we do not yet know nonetheless have 
the structural form of familiarity; be it as a spatial object, a cultural object, or a tool.132 It may be 
tempting to see parallels between Husserl’s active and passive genesis, and Heidegger’s distinction 
between Zuhandenheit and Vorhandenheit. However, such a comparison is not warranted. Although 
it is true that passive genesis is a pre-reflective mode of perceiving objects in which these nonetheless 
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carry sense, Husserl does not want to imply objects are ever entirely perceived passively. Moreover, 
Husserl’s concept does not allow for objects to switch back and forth between active and passive 
genesis, whereas for Heidegger things can move from Zuhandenheit to Vorhandenheit and vice versa.  
 
III.3 World and Intersubjectivity 
 
Husserl saves the true innovations for the fifth and final meditation. Central to the fifth meditation is 
an examination of the intersubjective structure of the transcendental ego. Husserl believes such an 
investigation is necessary in order to overcome the criticism that transcendental idealism leads to 
solipsism by reducing everything to the transcendental ego. It is understandable that solipsism is a real 
threat to Cartesian metaphysics. Descartes sought an unshakeable foundation from which he could 
find true knowledge, which he believed to have found in his ego as a thinking entity. Even if one accepts 
Descartes’ ego qua cogito as indubitable, it is still a serious challenge for Descartes to show that this 
allows for any certainty outside of the realm of the ego. As a result, Descartes’s ego runs the risk of 
becoming a solo ipse, severed from the outside world. It is remarkable for Husserl to take up the glove 
for the Cartesian ego, as his intentional consciousness already puts his ego in a relation to the outside 
world. Moreover, recall that in Ideen I, Husserl claims that the question of the existence of the outside 
world shows itself to be a non-problem after the épochè. The fact that Husserl now considers solipsism 
real threat to his phenomenology is one of the first indications that Husserl’s concept of world has 
evolved strongly since Ideen I.  
  According to Husserl, other egos or alter egos are by necessity implicated in the structure of 
the transcendental ego. His aim in the fifth meditation is therefore to make insightful how other egos 
are part of the structure of the ego.133 According to Husserl, we perceive the other egos we encounter 
in our experience-world both as objects in the world, as well as subjects to the world in which we 
encounter them. These other egos have their own representation of the world that is common to all, 
and which is accessible through experience. Therefore, investigating the intersubjective structure of 
the ego automatically entails reflecting on world constitution in individual egos, the relation of these 
individual worlds to that of other egos, and the intersubjective world that provides the experiences 
that are at the basis of these individual worlds.134  
  To aid his investigation Husserl introduces a new type of épochè. In the new épochè, the 
phenomenologist aims to delimit the my-own or Mir-Eigene within the complete horizon of his or her 
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transcendental experience. This requires abstracting all that is foreign or other, including other egos, 
and things that refer to other egos, like cultural objects. Contrary to the épochè of Ideen I, Husserl 
claims that the new épochè cannot entirely reduce the phenomenon world. An irreducible part of the 
ego is its physical body, which is embodied in a world. Moreover, it is the only object in this world 
through which the ego experiences the world. In this way, the épochè reveals a primordial and 
irreducible natural world, in which the ego experiences objects over time as spatially separated. 
Husserl seems to side with Kant, who in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft claims that space and time are 
irreducible Anschauungsformen of any experience.135 The reduced ego also perceives itself as a part of 
the primordial world, which it experiences as exterior. At the same time, it carries itself intentionally 
inside its body, which gives rise to the traditional distinction between an outside and an inside world.136 
It is one of the innovations of the Cartesianische Meditationen that Husserl deals a greater role to the 
body. The recognition of the body as the mediator between the transcendental ego and its experience-
world likewise marks a partial return of his ego to the world, undoing much of the distance between 
subject and world he introduced in Ideen I.  
 The question remains to be answered how the reduced ego moves from the primordial world 
to the experience of other egos in an intersubjective world. Husserl claims that the ego, within his own 
sphere of being, constructs an objective world as the totality of foreign beings. The first layer of this 
objective world are other egos. As an ego in a body in a world, the ego encounters other bodies, which 
it takes to be analogous to itself as alter egos. Although the bodies of other egos are not given like its 
own body, of which it is constantly aware through perception, the ego does perceive alter egos as 
having such a relation to their bodies. This recognition leads to a world-constituting perception; by 
recognizing that alter egos have perceptions of the same world, an intersubjective world can be 
constituted. In this manner, other egos allow for an endless domain of foreign beings, including the 
objective world and objective nature as we know them in the natural attitude. According to Husserl it 
is in the essence of egos that they never remain solitary. Instead, they always form a community of 
monads or Monadengemeinschaft, in which all egos appear as “human beings”; i.e., as psychophysical 
objects in the world.137 The community of monads has its own sphere of being, in which the objective 
world is constructed. This construction requires what Husserl calls a “Harmonie der Monaden.”138 The 
community of monads objectifies itself in various stages, the first of which constitutes intersubjective 
nature as the world in which monads encounter physical objects, including their own body and that of 
others. Because this by requires a shared temporality, the constitution of the world as nature by 
                                                          
135 See: Kant, Immanuel. Kritik der reinen Vernunft, (Köln, Anaconda Verlag, 2011), 79-106. 
136 Husserl, Cartesianische Meditationen, 98. 
137 Ibidem, 106. 
138 Ibidem, 107. 
 
Das Sein der Welt. Husserl and Heidegger on the Concept of World 
 
39 
 
necessity entails the institution of world-time.139 It is more difficult for Husserl to convincingly show 
how “higher” stages of the intersubjective world are constituted, such as the cultural world. According 
to Husserl, the constitution of any type of world out of experience takes a certain orientation within 
the horizon of its specific being. The primordial world takes its constitutive orientation to the stream 
of experiences, just like “nature” takes its orientation to experiences from the body. The cultural world 
is given in reference to what Husserl calls personality. In personality, “me and my culture” are always 
given in opposition to “foreign” culture.140 Sadly, Husserl fails to elaborate further on the constitution 
of higher aspects of the cultural world, and cuts his discussion short at this crucial point.  
  In all, the Cartesianische Meditationen will leave its reader with mixed feelings. On the one 
hand, the Cartesianische Meditationen demonstrate Husserl’s commitment to continuously improve 
his phenomenology. Innovations such as considering the embodied character of the transcendental 
ego attest to Husserl’s innovative capacity. In Cartesianische Meditationen, Husserl also shows himself 
to be more sensitive to the ontological implications of his phenomenology. He is consequently more 
aware of the various different layers of the phenomenon world, and is able to offer his most acute 
analysis of the phenomenon world yet. More than in Ideen I, Husserl is able to show how his ego 
constitutes its world, and how his conception of the world relates to the external world of which it 
finds itself a part. On the other hand however, the Cartesianische Meditationen fail to convincingly 
show the intersubjective nature of the transcendental ego, and to make insightful how the 
intersubjective world is created. In order to achieve this, Husserl would have to rework his 
phenomenology once again. 
 
 III.4 The European Crisis 
 
Following his emeritus Husserl was able to work on his phenomenology in relative peace and quiet. 
However, the rise of National Socialism in in the early 1930’s would severely disrupt Husserl’s work, 
who was born to converted Jewish parents. When anti-Semitic laws barred Jews from working in the 
public sector in 1933, Husserl was forced to take his permanent leave from the university. Husserl 
viewed his forced leave from the university as the worst affront of his life and an insult to his patriotism. 
By contrast, Heidegger believed that the rise of the National Socialism in Germany marked a decisive 
moment in European history, and sought active political involvement in the movement. In April 1934 
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Heidegger was elected as the rector of the University of Freiburg; two months later he joined the 
National-Socialist movement. In his position as rector, Heidegger took an active role in promoting 
National Socialism. Ironically, although the decision to bar Husserl from the university had been made 
before Heidegger had been appointed rector, it still fell upon him to reinforce the decision. In order to 
appease Husserl, Heidegger sent him flowers accompanied by a personal message. But by then, the 
damage was done. Husserl considered Heidegger’s entry into the National Socialist movement as their 
end as philosophical soulmates.141  
  The events in Germany inspired Husserl to once again rethink his phenomenology. Despite 
being barred from German universities, Husserl received the opportunity to communicate the new 
developments in his new philosophy during a series of lectures in Prague and Vienna in 1935. These 
lectures would be published in 1936 as Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die 
transzendentale Phänomenologie, Husserl’s final major work. One of the first things that will strike any 
reader is the different style Husserl employs in Krisis. Husserl uses far less technical language, making 
the work more accessible than his previous works. In Krisis, Husserl comments on a crisis, prompted 
by the scientific worldview that has come to dominate European society. According to Husserl, modern 
science and its tendency to objectify and factually describe the world has increasingly moved it away 
from the questions that concern us as human beings, namely, “die Fragen nach Sinn oder Sinnlosigkeit 
dieses ganzen menschlichen Daseins.”142   
  Husserl claims that ever since Descartes, the leading ideal of science has been to create a 
unitary theoretical system that comprises all scientifically relevant questions, and to offer the 
normative method to investigate these question with increasing rigor. This scientific-theoretical 
system has been elaborated by subsequent generations into an ever-greater system of questions with 
true answers.143 From the start, the unifying principle of this endeavor has been reason. The new 
method likewise informed metaphysics, and led to the ideal of a universal philosophy, encompassing 
reason and all being. But where the scientific method has yielded great successes in the sciences, 
Husserl claims that it has plunged philosophy into a crisis. Modern metaphysics has failed to make both 
reason and being insightful, because it proved impossible to differentiate beings from reason, when 
this same reason is used to determine what beings are. Consequently, 
Immer mehr wird die Vernunft selbst und ihr “Seiendes” rätselhaft, oder wird die Vernunft- als 
die der seienden Welt von sich aus Sinngebende- und von der Gegenseite gesehen- Welt als aus 
der Vernunft her seiende-, bis schlieβlich das bewuβt zutage gekommene Weltproblem der 
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tiefsten Wesensverbundenheit von Vernunft und Seiendem überhaupt, das Rätsel aller Rätsel, 
zum eigentlichen Thema werden muβte.144 
The crisis not only affects modern science and metaphysics, but modern European humanity as a whole. 
European humanity had sought to break radically with its past, and reinvent itself through modern 
philosophy and science. The failure of modern metaphysics to make mankind’s being transparent to 
itself therefore affects European humanity as a whole, “in der gesamten Sinnhaftigkeit seines 
kulturellen Lebens, in seiner gesamten ‘Existenz‘.“145 Overcoming the crisis thus requires coming to a 
new understanding of our own existence.   
  Husserl’s conception of the crisis marks a new direction in his thinking. Throughout his career, 
Husserl had been critical of the sciences, but had never attacked them on their fundamental 
shortcomings in making sense of human existence. To claim that the sciences have lost touch with 
questions pertaining to the sense or nonsense human existence, as well as his emphatic claim that the 
crisis of the European sciences is an existential crisis of European mankind as a whole, show a new 
sensitivity of Husserl for existential questions. Strikingly, Husserl’s implicit claim that philosophy should 
concern itself with such questions moves his thought in the direction of Heidegger’s fundamental 
ontology.             
  In order to overcome the crisis, Husserl believes it is first necessary to investigate the history 
of modern science and philosophy, and to trace its inherent tendencies to the present day. According 
to Husserl, this will help gain a better understanding of our present times and the crisis we now face. 
Husserl executes this investigation in the second part of Krisis, focusing on Galileo Galilei, Descartes, 
Kant, and Hume. It is the first time that Husserl engages so elaborately with the history of philosophy, 
and it is often interpreted as a reappraisal by Husserl of the role of history and its value to philosophy. 
David Carr even claims that the new role of history is the most important innovation in Krisis.146 Be 
that as it may, Husserl’s ultimate aim in Krisis is to offer a way out of the crisis through phenomenology. 
He believes to have found this way in his concept of the Lebenswelt, which he elaborates in the third 
and final part of Krisis. 
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III.5 Ontology and Lebenswelt 
 
Husserl starts his treatment of the Lebenswelt with the observation that all the positive sciences and 
metaphysics presuppose the Lebenswelt in an unquestioning and naïve way. The Lebenswelt is the 
realm in which we all live, and which is also the foundation for all the sciences, as well as culture. As 
Husserl already noted in the Cartesianische Meditationen, we as human beings find ourselves both as 
objects among objects in the Lebenswelt, as well subjects to the Lebenswelt, to whom this Lebenswelt 
only has sense in relation to our experience of it. Although our experiences are constantly changing, 
the world maintains a constant unity through all our different experiences within it.147 As subjects in 
the world, we are also aware of other subjects that likewise have an awareness of the world. So far 
Husserl’s analysis is in line with the Cartesianische Meditationen. However, in Krisis, other subjects play 
a more central role in the constitution of world. As Husserl sees it, “wir im Miteinanderleben haben 
Welt im Miteinander vorgegeben, als die für uns seiend-geltende, zu der wir im Miteinander auch, zur 
Welt als Welt für uns alle, als der in diesem Seinssinn vorgegebenen, gehören.“148 In this way, the world 
is always presupposed in all our actions as the shared horizon of indubitable and valid beings. Inversely, 
it is through our actions that the Lebenswelt as this horizon is shaped as the self-evident world we 
experience in daily life.   
  It is at this point that Husserl comments on a relatively new form of praxis within the 
Lebenswelt; theoretical praxis. The pre-scientific horizon of the Lebenswelt is likewise presupposed by 
the objective sciences, and all their activities take place within this horizon. It is the aim of the objective 
sciences to find universal truths within and about the Lebenswelt. For Husserl, what is of primary 
concern here is not how the sciences formulate these truths about the Lebenswelt. Physicists often 
claim that they describe the world we experience, but according to Husserl this view is not entirely 
accurate. Physicists derive the justifications for their assertions from the Lebenswelt, which is also the 
source of their objectifications. However, the objectifications of the sciences are not the same as our 
objectifications of these things in experience. As such, the objective world that is described by the 
sciences is no more than an abstraction from the Lebenswelt, which cannot reach its essence, and 
cannot do justice to our full experience within the Lebenswelt. The central question to Husserl is how 
objects that are primarily given pre-scientifically, and are subsequently given scientifically, relate to 
the world constituted by the subject. The objective sciences cannot answer this question adequately, 
for they are exterior to the subject, and can only capture the world in exteriorities. By contrast, “[d]ie 
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radikale Weltbetrachtung ist systematische und reine Innenbetrachtung der sich selbst im Auβen 
“auβernden“ Subjektivität.“149 In order to conduct such a radical investigation of the world, the world 
of the objective sciences must first be turned off. As we may have come to expect of Husserl, he 
proposes to do so through a new épochè.  
  By and large, the épochè Husserl proposes in Krisis is similar to that of his earlier works, as it 
again requires the phenomenologist to refrain from judging about the being or non-being, truth or 
falsehood of the world of the natural attitude. What is novel however is what remains after the épochè. 
As we have seen in the Cartesianische Meditationen, Husserl in his later works no longer claims that 
the épochè can entirely reduce the world. Husserl now expands on this idea, and gives it a specifically 
intersubjective interpretation. According to Husserl, we have a world-horizon as the horizon of 
possible experiences of things. These things include stones, plants, other human beings, and cultural 
objects. In our daily lives we live in general agreement about the sense these objects have. However, 
this sense is not universal; once we encounter people of different cultures, we become aware of the 
fact that many of these objects have a different sense to others. Even so, Husserl claims that if we take 
it as our aim to find general truths about objects in the Lebenswelt, we will be able to reach consensus 
about certain aspects of things that make them accessible to us. Examples of such generalities are 
movement and form. What these generalities show is that the Lebenswelt has a general structure, to 
which all relative beings are bound, but which is itself not relative. All human activity is related to this 
a priori structure. The objective sciences likewise take the a priori structure of the Lebenswelt as its 
subject. However, the a priori of the objective sciences is secondary to the a priori structure of the 
Lebenswelt itself. For this reason, Husserl claims that we must differentiate between the a priori of the 
Lebenswelt and the objective a priori of the sciences, which derive from the former.150  
  The most fundamental structures of the Lebenswelt are those between objects and world. 
According to Husserl, our most common conception of the world in daily life is that of the world as the 
collection of all things that are, or onta. Objects are given to us within the world horizon. We as subjects 
within the Lebenswelt are aware of the world as the horizon of all possible praxis and experience, 
which is itself not a thing. The investigation of the Lebenswelt requires the phenomenologists to 
remain awake for this world (wachbleiben), which entails maintaining a constant interest in  
das Wie der gegebenheitsweisen und für die Onta selbst, aber nicht geradehin, sondern 
als Objekte in ihrem Wie, eben in der ausschlieβlichen und ständigen Interessenrichtung 
darauf, wie im Wandel relativer Geltungen, […] die Welt für uns zustande kommt.151  
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With the épochè of the Lebenswelt, Husserl claims to have found a vantage point over and 
beyond subjective and intersubjective consciousness, from which the ontological structures of 
the world around us can be examined. In this sense, the épochè of the Lebenswelt differs from 
that of Ideen I. As Michael Friedman has aptly put it, the Ideen begin by “simultaneously 
bracketing […] both what Husserl later calls the life-world and all objective sciences that emerge 
from it, whereas Crisis begins by contrasting the life-world with the objective sciences that 
emerge from it and then bracketing the latter on behalf of the former.”152  
  One contentious question remains to be addressed at this point. The Lebenswelt seems 
to propose a very different approach to phenomenology than Husserl’s previous work. So what 
is the relation between the Lebenswelt and Husserl’s transcendental ego? The first thing we 
must establish is that for Husserl, the Lebenswelt is not meant to negate or replace the study of 
intentional consciousness, for in the second half of the third part of Krisis, Husserl offers an 
exposition of his study of intentional consciousness. Instead, it seems that Husserl viewed the 
Lebenswelt as an addition to the study of intentional consciousness, aimed to expand the scope 
of phenomenological inquiry, allowing it to investigate new questions. The most important of all 
these questions; how the world comes to be for us. 
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Conclusion 
 
Krisis would be Husserl’s philosophical swansong. Shortly after the publication of the first two parts, 
Husserl fell ill, to die of lung disease in 1938. Because of the rising anti-Semitism of the late thirties, 
relatively few people attended his funeral. Heidegger likewise did not attend the ceremony due to 
illness. 153  We have the Belgian priest Hermann Van Breda to thank that so much of Husserl’s 
manuscripts have survived the Nazi era, including the final part of Krisis containing Husserl’s discussion 
of the Lebenswelt. Van Breda smuggled some 40.000 unpublished manuscript pages to the University 
of Leuven, Belgium, where they are still kept today in the Husserl archives. Although it would take the 
Husserl archives many years to publish the most important parts of Husserl’s manuscriopts, these 
nonetheless managed to exert great influence on the development of postwar phenomenology, 
particularly in France. Maurice Merleau-Ponty for example visited the archives in 1939 to study 
Husserl’s manuscripts, especially those pertaining to the Lebenswelt. Through this remarkable chain of 
events, the Lebenswelt has managed to become the most influential concept of Husserl’s oeuvre.154
 Over the past few chapters, I have traced the development of the concept of world in the works 
of Husserl and Heidegger. As my treatment has shown, the concept world underwent significant 
development over the course of Husserl’s impressive philosophical career. From being a concept of 
relatively minor importance, Husserl is forced to admit its import after his transcendental turn in Ideen 
I. By contrast, the concept of world had been at the center of Heidegger’s search for a new metaphysics 
that could do justice to our pre-scientific experience of the world, culminating with his analysis of 
Dasein as In-der-Welt-sein in SuZ. We can credit Heidegger for sensing the true radicalism of Husserl’s 
phenomenology, and to follow through with the dismantling and destruction of traditional 
metaphysics to an extent that Husserl himself at first proved unwilling or unable to do. In the final 
chapter we have seen how Husserl once again reinvents his phenomenology with the Lebenswelt. In 
an attempt to find even more secure foundations for his phenomenology, Husserl turns to the world 
as the foundation of all possible experience and human activity, including science. Although the 
novelty of the Lebenswelt has at times been questioned, my investigation has shown that the 
Lebenswelt does differ fundamentally from Husserl’s earlier phenomenology. With the Lebenswelt, 
Husserl for the first time reflects on a pre-scientific realm of experience, in order to make sense of 
human existence. There has been much speculation among Husserl scholars as to why Husserl came 
to rethink his phenomenology with the Lebenswelt. As I argue, the reason why Husserl came to rethink 
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and deal more attention to the concept of world in his later work is inherent to phenomenology itself. 
If, as Husserl and Heidegger see it, phenomenology is about the radical and unprejudiced investigation 
of experience, it seems that this must inevitably lead to investigating the ultimate foundation of all 
experience; the world in which we live, and to which all thought, action, and knowledge relate.  
 The change in orientation with the Lebenswelt ironically moves Husserl’s phenomenology in 
the direction of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, of which he had had such misgivings. Even so, there 
remain significant differences between the philosophies of Husserl and Heidegger. Throughout his 
career, Husserl had sought to provide philosophy with the method that could elevate it to a strict 
science, capable of providing the empirical sciences with its epistemology. Strict scientificity remained 
the ideal for the Lebenswelt, even though the scope of his phenomenology had moved far beyond 
epistemology to include existential questions. Heidegger on the other hand was far less concerned 
with scientific norms or building bridges between his metaphysics and the empirical sciences. 
Furthermore, Heidegger’s abstract and often esoteric style makes it more difficult to see how his 
philosophy could be adopted by the empirical scientist. Consequently, Husserl’s philosophy and 
concept of world is of greater utility to empirical scientists and philosophers of science than that of 
Heidegger. Perhaps the most import difference between Husserl and Heidegger are their 
fundamentally different conceptions of what it means to be human. For Husserl, human beings are 
primarily related to the world through the intentional acts that relate their consciousness to the 
objects around it. Heidegger on the other hand stresses the openness of human beings to being, which 
allows it to encounter beings within its world. When it comes to intersubjectivity, there are likewise 
profound differences. For Heidegger, the intersubjective sphere dictates mediocrity and threatens 
Dasein’s capacity for a good and authentic understanding of itself and being. Husserl has a more 
positive view of intersubjectivity, as it can help human beings reach freedom and knowledge.
 Nonetheless, these differences cannot hide the similarities between Husserl and Heidegger. 
Both were intimately familiar with the tradition of metaphysics from Plato and Aristotle to Kant and 
the Neo-Kantians, and both thinkers based their critique of traditional metaphysics on an acute 
understanding of its method and suppositions. For Husserl, the only way to overcome the problems of 
metaphysics and to find secure foundations for philosophy is by turning off all previous knowledge and 
assumptions through successive épochès, and to describe phenomena unprejudiced as they present 
themselves in experience. Even though Heidegger uses phenomenology for different ends, his method 
of reduction and destruction by and large stays true to the spirit of Husserl’s épochè. Finally, both 
Husserl and Heidegger place experience central to their philosophies, trying to make insightful how we 
interact and make sense of the world around us and the things in it.  
  My present investigation of the concept of world in Husserl in Heidegger opens many paths for 
future research. There are many aspects of both philosophers that I have not been able to discuss in 
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great detail. These include the concept of time and time-consciousness, which also relate to the 
concepts of world and to the conception of world constitution of Husserl and Heidegger. Another 
theme that I have also not been able to discuss exhaustively is that of intersubjectivity, especially in 
the philosophy of Heidegger. The intersubjective world is a layer of the concept of world that has 
traditionally posed great difficulties for phenomenology, and deserves further investigation. Finally, 
the possibility of knowledge of the world is closely related to the concept of truth, and forms another 
interesting point of comparison between both philosophers.   
  Ultimately, I hope my work might provide an impetus to investigations of the concept of world 
in phenomenology and philosophy as in general. My research has demonstrated the central 
importance of the concept of world to phenomenology. If the aim of phenomenology is to make sense 
of our experience, it cannot pass over the world within which we live, however self-evident this world 
may appear at first sight. Indeed, on closer inspection, we find ourselves forced to agree with Husserl, 
and consider the world as the mystery of all mysteries.  
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